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Evidentiary Instructions Improve Mock Juror Assessment of Feature-Comparison Evidence 
 
Abstract 
Feature-comparison evidence has been introduced in court without sufficient scientific 
validation and has been at the heart of numerous miscarriages of justice. Juror assessment of 
such evidence and the efficacy of evidentiary instructions were examined through a mock jury 
experiment with case reports featuring either central or peripheral feature-comparison 
evidence. In a case-control design (N = 174), the test group was exposed to an evidentiary 
instruction about the ear print evidence presented in the first case report (adapted from R v 
Dallagher [2002] EWCA Crim 1903) whereas the control group did not receive such an 
instruction. The provision of this instruction resulted in a significant decrease in verdict 
severity with a large effect size. For the second case report (based on R v George (Barry) [2007] 
EWCA Crim 2722), all subjects were asked to return verdicts based on circumstantial evidence, 
gunpowder residue evidence, and an evidentiary instruction about that gunpowder residue 
evidence. Verdict severity increased significantly after the provision of gunpowder residue 
evidence, followed by a subsequent reduction in verdict severity after the introduction of an 
evidentiary instruction. Furthermore, there was a significant difference in verdict severity 
between the test and control group, suggesting that the test group exhibited a scepticism effect 
brought about by the initial evidentiary instruction about ear print evidence. This study 
demonstrates that although mock jurors consider feature-comparison evidence a convincing 
indicator of guilt, the provision of an evidentiary instruction has the potential to educate jurors 
about the limitations of such evidence. 
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England and Wales adhere to a procedural tradition of adversarial fact-finding and narrative 
building in which the prosecution and defence are expected to collect evidence in the pre-trial 
phase to subsequently present these findings in court (Brants & Field, 2016). Within this 
framework of adversarial litigation jurors are considered impartial decision-makers who decide 
on innocence or guilt after an adequate evaluation and discussion of the evidence (Brants & 
Field, 2016; Dunne, 2015). Criminal case judgment in England and Wales is thus strongly 
wedded to the principle of lay fact-finding by jurors, who are expected to employ common 
sense reasoning in their assessment of the facts of the case (Jackson et al., 2015).  
With the increased popularity and complexity of forensic evidence in court comes the 
question whether jurors are equipped with sufficient tools to carry out this responsibility. Legal 
reviews of past convictions have given rise to an increased scepticism about the scientific basis 
of forensic evidence and have put a spotlight on the occurrence of miscarriages of justice due 
to misconceptions regarding its reliability (Adam, 2016). The discovery of a single piece of 
evidence during a criminal investigation can become of crucial importance in court, and the 
collection and analysis of evidence have therefore become one of the most important and 
challenging features of the practice of law (Anderson et al., 2005). This article investigates 
mock jurors’ assessment of forensic evidence through a literature review and a mock jury 
experiment in which the impact of evidentiary instructions on decision-making in cases with 
central and peripheral feature-comparison evidence is examined.  
 
Scientific Evidence 
Forensic science refers to all scientific tests or techniques relevant to legal proceedings. The 
term masks the complexities that come with the use of forensic science in court as a significant 
amount of such evidence may come from disciplines outside of what has traditionally been 
understood as the forensic sciences and can be produced by institutions and individuals whose 
primary discipline is unrelated to the criminal justice system (e.g. expert medical testimony in 
Sudden Infant Death Syndrome cases) (Sense about Science & Euroforgen, 2017; Wilson et 
al., 2014). Due to this disciplinary fragmentation little attention has been paid to underlying 
issues such as the potential of replication, confirmation through peer review or the risks 
associated with bias, let alone to the difficulties that come with communicating scientific 
knowledge to a lay audience (Dror et al., 2017; Jackson et al., 2015).  
The increased concentration of expertise within the police effectively limits the 
availability of equivalent experts to the defence, whose independent examination of the 
evidence may at times be the only effective way of resolving bias (Wilson et al., 2014). In some 
fields of expertise it is in fact impossible for a defence expert to obtain domestically recognised 
qualifications (Wilson et al., 2014). For example, in R v Smith [2011] EWCA Crim 1296, the 
court expressed concern about the fact that there is no opportunity to become qualified as a 
fingerprint expert in England and Wales except through participation in the police force 
training. It then seems that the equality of arms on which adversarial fact-finding is thought to 
depend may not exist in a system in which the prosecution has superior access to witnesses, 
surveillance materials, forensic science support and databases (Brants & Field, 2016; Wilson 
et al., 2014). The result of such inequality is that a judge may be more likely to accept evidence 
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provided by a prosecution expert, even though the context is one in which the expert pool 
available to the defence is deficient (Wilson et al., 2014).  
The closure of the Forensic Science Service (FSS) in 2012, is believed to have 
destabilised and even posed a threat to the production of scientific evidence (Wilson et al., 
2014). The lack of a common form of governance regulating the forensic sciences has 
compromised the ability of judges and lawyers to recognise problems with scientific evidence 
and to improve mechanisms for admitting, representing, and reviewing such evidence (Martire 
& Edmond, 2017; Roach, 2009). Consequentially, courts may rely on simplistic or even 
misguided proxies for the evaluation and admission of such evidence while judges are not well 
positioned to guide jurors on its assessment (Martire & Edmond, 2017). Although validity and 
reliability studies can produce indicative levels of performance, courts tend to either not require 
this information or are unnecessarily dismissive of such findings (Martire & Edmond, 2017). 
The growing importance of forensic evidence in court thus poses a challenge to both experts, 
who find themselves in a position in which they must communicate complicated scientific 
findings to a lay audience, and to jurors who must adequately assess the value of such evidence 
(Diamond, 2007; Hans, 2007). Research has demonstrated that judges often fail to comprehend 
scientific evidence but nevertheless report high confidence when asked about their scientific 
literacy (de Keijser & Elffers, 2012; McAuliff & Duckworth, 2010). A survey in the USA 
alarmingly found that as little as five percent of the participating judges could explain the 
meaning of falsifiability while an even smaller percentage managed to define error rate 
(Benforado, 2015). The fact that jurors who may be less knowledgeable and educated than 
judges are expected to comprehend and assess the validity of scientific evidence admitted in 
court is concerning.  
  
Admissibility in England and Wales – State of Affairs 
Courts in England and Wales have adopted some of the most liberal admissibility practices 
among advanced common law jurisdictions (Edmond, 2015b). The rules governing the 
admissibility of expert testimony have developed within the common law system and are 
referred to as the common-law admissibility test (Henneberg, 2015). This test stipulates that, 
to be considered sufficiently reliable to be admitted, evidence must be relevant, necessary to 
assist the jury (helpful), and given by a competent witness (Ward et al., 2017). As jurors may 
attach great weight to evidence provided by experts, additional rules regulate how the court 
must be persuaded of the reliability of its scientific foundations (Ormerod & Sturman, 2005). 
However, there is no preliminary inquiry about the reliability of the science if the court feels 
acquainted with the type of evidence. The extent to which the courts scrutinise the reliability 
and validity of scientific evidence, and by which criteria they assess reliability to begin with, 
thus remains unclear (Ormerod & Sturman, 2005). A plethora of cases exist in which 
questionable scientific evidence significantly influenced final verdicts to, on appeal, be 
considered unreliable or at least to require special consideration (Ireland & Beaumont, 2015).  
The Turner rule, established in the leading case R v Turner (1975), limits the reception 
of expert opinion evidence by stipulating that it is inadmissible unless it provides the court with 
information outside of the jurors’ common experience and knowledge. It can be argued that 
one should not limit this admissibility requirement to materials the jury does not know about, 
but extend it to materials the jury mistakenly think they know about (Ormerod & Sturman, 
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2005). This line of reasoning has become increasingly relevant amidst the popularity of 
television programmes which make the use of forensic techniques in criminal investigations 
seem nearly infallible. Prosecutors have attributed the jury’s unrealistic expectations of crime-
solving to such portrayals and have reported concerns that jurors may discredit prosecutions 
that seem thin on science (Weiss & Xuan, 2015). Academics, on the contrary, fear that jurors 
may fail to properly evaluate the evidence provided and may blindly accept scientific testimony 
instead (Benforado, 2015).  
According to the Turner rule, expert evidence must furthermore be necessary for a 
proper resolution of the dispute and must be based on facts which themselves can be proven 
by admissible evidence (Ebisike, 2008; Freckelton, 2014). These regulations may sound 
restrictive but do not stipulate that a scientific technique must be generally accepted. It was 
decided in R v Robb (1991) that general acceptance is not a necessity for the admissibility of 
expert testimony as long as the evidence is sufficiently established to be reliable (Ebisike, 
2008). However, a new hurdle arose with the increased introduction of novel techniques as it 
became apparent that courts had at times failed to give new techniques the focused attention 
they warrant (Ireland & Beaumont, 2015; Ormerod & Sturman, 2005). One of the dangers of 
introducing novel techniques is that, as there are fewer experts to call upon, the expert in 
question may be subjected to less effective challenge and the evidence may be afforded a 
disproportionate weight (Ormerod & Sturman, 2005). On appeal this creates further problems 
as proclaimed innocence in a conviction based on dubious evidence is not always a convincing 
reason for the Criminal Cases Review Commission (CCRC) to accept an application or to refer 
the case to the Court of Appeal (Henneberg, 2017). 
Although the admissibility rules may seem to establish safeguards against the 
admittance of junk science in court, the House of Commons’ Science and Technology 
Committee has voiced concerns that scientific expert witness testimony is admitted in court 
without sufficient scrutiny. The Law Commission (2011) of England and Wales has proposed 
that judges should provide a cautionary instruction to the jury if a case hinges on disputed 
scientific evidence (Child et al., 2015). Although the Ministry of Justice shared the concern 
that courts are ill-equipped to resolve arguments about the scientific authority of experts, the 
Law Commission’s draft bill was rejected in 2013 with expenses cited as the main reason for 
this rejection (Henneberg, 2015; Wilson et al., 2014). Instead of accepting the proposed bill, 
the government asked the Criminal Procedure Rule Committee to consider amendments to the 
Criminal Procedure Rules to introduce the spirit of the Law Commission’s recommendations 
(Stockdale & Jackson, 2016). A series of enquiries and reports on expert evidence and the law 
have taken place since, but this has ultimately led to a retention of the status quo (Adam, 2016). 
Even if the Law Commission produced and promoted an improved standard, the issue at stake 
is that it proposes to impose it on a system that is insufficiently prepared to apply it effectively 
(Edmond & Roberts, 2011).  
A promising recent development aimed to stimulate a better understanding of complex 
evidence is the creation of scientific guides to aid judges in the assessment of scientific validity 
and admissibility (Ghosh, 2017). However, if academics have not yet reached consensus on the 
limitations of a certain science, or a new forensic technique emerges, there will be no such 
guide available to aid judges in its assessment. If unreliable forensic evidence is admitted in 
court as a result of this, safeguarding the jury’s ability to understand and evaluate forensic 
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evidence remains imperative to a proper functioning of the judicial decision-making process 
(McAuliff & Duckworth, 2010; Thomas, 2010).  
 
Judicial Safeguards 
Although judicial safeguards such as evidentiary instructions have been hypothesized to 
provide the education necessary to enable jurors to make informed decisions about scientific 
evidence, the provision of such instructions is still uncommon. The court has, however, 
established guidelines for judges in trials that involve disputed identification evidence. The 
Turnbull directions (R v Turnbull [1997] QB 224) allow judges to provide jurors with 
precautions before the introduction of eyewitness testimony evidence (Bromby et al., 2007). 
These precautions are intended to raise awareness of issues that could impact the reliability of 
the eyewitness testimony evidence. One could argue that similar directions should be provided 
before the introduction of other types of evidence. Indeed, the provision of evidential 
instructions in an adversarial system comes with distinct advantages for such instructions are 
focused and concise, authoritative when coming from the trial judge, less costly than competing 
expert testimony, and can avoid confusion created by duelling experts (Jones, 2017). To be 
effective, safeguards should maximise juror sensitivity to factors that influence the reliability 
of forensic evidence, and the timing of an instruction may impact this effectiveness (Cutler et 
al., 1990; Jones et al., 2017). Research suggests that instructions on the burden of proof and 
reasonable doubt are most effective when delivered prior to the introduction of evidence (Jones 
et al., 2017). In line with these findings it can be hypothesised that, if provided before the 
introduction of forensic evidence, evidentiary instructions can assist jurors in evaluating 
evidence in line with academic and legal standards (Jones et al., 2017). However, for 
evidentiary instructions to be effective jurors must be capable and willing to follow them. 
Unfortunately, research has revealed that jurors experience difficulties in understanding and 
applying many types of judicial and evidentiary instructions (Baguley et al., 2017; Jones et al., 
2017; Valentine & Fitzgerald, 2016).  
It is important to bear in mind that the introduction of an evidentiary instruction is not 
without its problems as it could come with a risk of undue caution (Bromby et al., 2007). The 
desired result of a jury direction is to induce juror sensitivity, not scepticism. The latter can be 
defined as a general distrust of all evidence, even when this caution is not merited (Leverick, 
2014). It is possible that the introduction of an evidentiary instruction gives rise to a scepticism 
effect (McAuliff & Duckworth, 2010). This is in line with findings of opposing expert 
testimony research by Levett and Kovera (2009), who demonstrated that the mere presence of 
an opposing expert causes jurors to become more sceptical of the initial expert’s testimony. 
However, scepticism effects found within expert testimony research may be due to the unique 
way in which experts educate the jury relative to other safeguards (Jones et al., 2017). Such 
findings do not necessarily demonstrate that an evidentiary instruction would cause a similar 
scepticism effect.  
 
Jury Research 
Legal practitioners have long held the opinion that jurors are capable of assessing scientific 
evidence despite a lack of legal or scientific sophistication (Boudreau & McCubbins, 2009). 
This lack of specialized knowledge and experience was considered advantageous for it can act 
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as a safeguard against a biased judiciary or overzealous prosecution (Hans, 2012). However, it 
is important not to take at face value the assumption that jurors, through general education and 
experience, have become sufficiently equipped to cope with the demands of interpreting 
complex scientific reasoning (Jackson et al., 2015). The problem at stake is that findings of 
scientific studies are often counter-intuitive and outside the knowledge of an average juror 
(Leverick, 2016). Academics have therefore expressed concerns that jurors are not capable of 
assessing scientific evidence and may ignore crucial evidence or take it at face value by 
focusing on the expert’s credentials (Diamond, 2007; McAuliff & Duckworth, 2010). This 
heuristic, known as source expertise, could be particularly present in legal settings if jurors are 
aware that experts must meet certain criteria to provide testimony in court and may therefore 
assume that the testimony must be relevant and reliable.  
Research has demonstrated that, when confronted with complex scientific testimony, 
jurors considered scientists with a PhD from a prestigious university more persuasive (Cooper 
& Hall, 2000). Jurors may moreover believe that expertise is linked to excellent performance 
or skill in a particular task rather than to a broad range of professional competencies (Martire 
& Edmond, 2017). In reality experts may become respected and considered experienced for 
critical thinking, competent use of assessment tools, rapport building with clients, or 
communication skills instead of for making more correct predictions (Martire & Edmond, 
2017). Such observations underscore the responsibility of judges and lawyers to ensure that 
evidence is presented in a comprehensible manner, but courts have expressed discomfort with 
the task of reviewing methodological foundations of scientific research and tend to avoid 
methodological explorations of expert evidence during trial (Jackson et al., 2015; Martire & 
Edmond, 2017; Newirth, 2016).  
Jury comprehension research in England and Wales has demonstrated that more than 
half of jurors do not entirely comprehend what happens in court, citing legal terminology as 
the main impediment (Bromby et al., 2007). Thomas (2010) conducted a study in which 797 
jurors at three courts in England observed the same simulated trial and heard the same 
directions and found that, although over half of the jurors reportedly perceived the directions 
easy to understand, only a minority of jurors actually fully comprehended the directions. It has 
been argued that at least some barriers to comprehension may stem from limitations in working 
memory. Asking jurors to retain all the information discussed at trial may be unreasonable 
(Leverick, 2014). Indeed, in the aforementioned study a written summary of the judge’s 
direction, provided at the time of the judge’s verbal instructions, improved juror 
comprehension of the law (Thomas, 2010). In line with this finding, a trial judge in England 
provided written directions to jurors in all criminal cases for several months and concluded that 
it almost eliminated request for reminders and further guidance on the law (Leverick, 2014). 
Research has moreover suggested that juries are more likely to follow directions if it is 
explicitly explained why these directions are given (Leverick, 2014). In the case of forensic 
evidence, a jury instruction could stipulate that individuals have been wrongfully convicted on 
the basis of flawed evidence of the same nature before. Providing written instructions is 
however not an adequate solution if the directions are inherently unclear. An unawareness of 
the limitations of certain types of evidence can only be addressed by judicial training (Leverick, 
2014).   
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The provision of jury instructions, whether verbal or in writing, has been subject of 
ongoing debate. Much research has focused on simplifying complex instructions but, as of yet, 
not one technique was found to consistently improve mock juror comprehension of complex 
evidence (Baguley et al, 2017). Cicchini and White (2016) provided 300 mock jurors with one 
of three instructions on the burden of proof after reading a summary of a hypothetical criminal 
case. After reading the case participants either received an instruction to search for the truth, a 
proper instruction on reasonable doubt, or a combined instruction on reasonable doubt followed 
by a stipulation to search for truth instead of doubt. The authors reported a near double 
conviction rate amongst jurors who had been instructed to search for the truth (Cicchini & 
White, 2016). This result seems to indicate that jury instructions can significantly alter jury 
decision-making. Other studies, however, have uncovered no effect or more moderate results. 
Ellison and Munro (2015), for example, explored the extent to which participants can 
understand and apply a judicial direction provided both verbally and in writing by asking 
participants to deliberate in groups towards a unanimous verdict after observing a rape trial re-
enactment. The instruction intended to guide mock jurors’ assessment of the evidence and 
stipulated what legal tests were applicable. The authors found that participants made limited 
use of the instruction and instead relied on personal recollections and (mis)interpretations of 
legal tests as well as on personal evaluations of weight and credibility (Ellison & Munro, 2015).  
 The jury instructions discussed up until this point can be classified as procedural 
instructions whereas this study is particularly concerned with evidentiary instructions. 
O’Donnell and Safer (2017) examined whether an enhanced evidentiary instruction, in which 
empirical findings were added to a standard instruction, could sensitize mock jurors to 
confession evidence in a criminal trial transcript in which a defendant’s recanted confession 
was either gathered using coercive or appropriate tactics. The results were more promising and 
indicated that, compared to the standard instruction, the enhanced instruction successfully 
sensitized mock jurors to the strength of the confession evidence rather than merely inducing 
a scepticism effect (O’Donnell & Safer, 2017). In 2011, the New Jersey judiciary in the United 
States implemented a reformed evidentiary instruction about eyewitness identification 
evidence, often referred to as the Henderson instruction. Papiliou et al. (2014) put this 
instruction to the test in a study in which 335 mock jurors watched a murder trial for which the 
strength of the identification evidence was manipulated. The participants received either a 
standard evidentiary instruction or the Henderson instruction, which addresses the 
shortcomings of the standard evidentiary instruction by outlining the three stages of memory 
and by explaining how nine estimator variables and seven system variables, which are in the 
State’s control, influence identification accuracy. Those who received the standard instruction 
were found to be more than twice as likely to convict. However, those who received the 
Henderson instruction discounted weak and strong testimony in a similar manner and thus did 
not display an improved ability to discern quality. In other words, the evidentiary instruction 
triggered scepticism instead of increased sensitivity. Dillon et al. (2017) reported similar 
findings when conducting a study in which 468 participants watched a trial simulation in which 
the strength of eyewitness evidence was manipulated. The participants either received a 
Henderson instruction prior to the eyewitness testimony, at the end of the trial, or not at all. 
The authors found that the Henderson instruction induced overall scepticism instead of 
sensitizing jurors.  
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Deficiencies in the forensic sciences have become particularly prevalent across feature 
comparison disciplines (in which a crime scene sample is compared with a reference sample) 
as such evidence has been introduced in court without meaningful scientific validation or 
reliability testing (President's Council of Advisors on Science and Technology, 2016). When 
it comes to feature comparison evidence, courts in England and Wales routinely admit the 
opinions of forensic experts (Edmond, 2015b). Eastwood and Caldwell (2015) examined 
whether opposing expert witness testimony and the provision of judicial instructions can 
mitigate the impact of invalid forensic science testimony about hair comparison evidence. The 
authors found that judicial instructions had no impact on verdict decisions and, although the 
opposing expert condition seemed more successful, both safeguards were relatively ineffective 
(Eastwood & Caldwell, 2015). The finding that the provision of opposing expert testimony 
reduces the rate of guilty verdicts is not so comforting when considering that, realistically, the 
first expert may not get challenged at all as the defence often does not employ an opposing 
expert. This implies that jurors faced with invalid feature comparison evidence may be forced 
to rely on their own determination to assess the quality of the testimony (Eastwood & Caldwell, 
2015). Moreover, although the judge in this study provided similar information in the judicial 
instruction as the opposing expert witness did in their testimony, contrary to the expert’s 
testimony no mention was made of the fact that this instruction was supported by experts or 
scientific findings (Eastwood & Caldwell, 2015). The inclusion of this information could have 
made the instruction more effective. The judicial instruction about hair comparison evidence 
was furthermore provided at the end of the trial and was embedded within general instructions 
about how jurors should reach their verdict. It is possible that the participants had already 
processed the evidence by then and did not expect new information (Eastwood & Caldwell, 
2015). As of yet research on the efficacy of jury instructions, and the risk of such instructions 
inducing scepticism effects, thus seems inconclusive.  
 
A Mock Jury Experiment 
Research Design 
An online mock jury experiment with a mixed methods design of closed and open survey 
questions was created in which the qualitative answers were converted into quantitative data 
for ease of subsequent analysis. The independent variables were central versus peripheral 
scientific evidence and evidentiary instruction versus no evidentiary instruction, whereas the 
dependent variables were verdict and confidence level. The dependent variables were assessed 
through a Likert scale with each Likert item providing a range of fixed-choice answer options.  
 
Materials 
After an analysis of over 100 established and alleged miscarriages of justice in England and 
Wales, two cases were selected based on the type of scientific evidence at stake and the 
significant role of expert testimony during the trial. The cases selected for this experiment 
centre on feature comparison evidence. This approach was adopted because feature comparison 
is a common forensic activity, science has clear standards to determine whether such methods 
are reliable, and it has become apparent that faulty feature comparison evidence has been at the 
heart of numerous miscarriages of justice (Adam, 2016; President's Council of Advisors on 
Science and Technology, 2016). Moreover, the problems with such evidence cannot merely be 
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attributed to poor performance by a few experts as the reliability of many feature comparison 
methods has never been meaningfully investigated. This is worrying as it has been 
hypothesised that the majority of jurors lack the ability to interpret the probative value of 
feature comparison evidence and that the prejudicial impact moreover may be high as jurors 
are likely to overestimate the value of a ‘match’ between samples (President's Council of 
Advisors on Science and Technology, 2016).  
In the first case, R v Dallagher [2002] EWCA Crim 1903, ear print evidence was 
admitted because two experts proffered it to be reliable, rigorous and of the highest scientific 
quality (Ireland & Beaumont, 2015). The judge stated that the expert testimony should be 
considered sufficient evidence for a conviction if the jurors accepted the testimony provided 
by the first of the two experts, who reportedly was absolutely convinced that the ear print found 
on a window at the crime scene matched the suspect’s ear. A DNA analysis of material 
recovered from the ear print later demonstrated that this DNA could not have come from the 
suspect. As the conviction was largely decided on the basis of expert evidence from a new area 
of expertise, inconsistent with evidence from established sciences, it was concluded that the 
conviction had included over-focus on a single element of scientific evidence (Ireland & 
Beaumont, 2015). This high profile, controversial case gave rise to fundamental debates on the 
scientific basis and the nature of admissible opinion evidence and underscores that scientific 
validity must be assessed within the framework of a broader scientific discipline (Adam, 2016). 
The fact that an ear print examiner defends the validity of ear print examination means little 
and experience from previous casework cannot be considered informative because ‘the right 
answer’ is typically unknown as an examiner cannot accurately know how often he or she has 
erroneously declared matches (Executive Office of the President, 2016). Indeed, this case 
demonstrates the importance of establishing expertise through performance assessment as ear 
print pattern matching is relatively straightforward, quite probative and among the easiest to 
empirically test (Martire & Edmond, 2017). In the adapted case report created for this study, 
any other circumstantial or peripheral evidence was left out as the aim of the first case report 
was to establish the effect of an evidentiary instruction about central forensic evidence on 
verdict severity ratings returned by mock jurors.  
The second case is based on R v George (Barry) [2007] EWCA Crim 2722, in which a 
single particle of gunpowder discharge residue found in the suspect’s coat pocket a year after 
the crime was submitted as scientific evidence during the trial and claimed to link the defendant 
to the murder of Crimewatch presenter Jill Dando. The defendant was initially found guilty but 
was acquitted after seven years of imprisonment when it was successfully argued that the 
gunpowder residue could have been transferred from armed officers at the scene (Ireland & 
Beaumont, 2015). Although a first appeal had been dismissed, the CCRC ended up referring 
the conviction back to the Court of Appeal after commissioning a further report on the FDR 
evidence. The second (and successful) appeal revealed a fresh evaluation of the facts based on 
two competing propositions: Mr George is the man who shot Ms Dando vs. Mr George is not 
the man who shot Ms Dando. A group of experts formulated likelihood ratios and concluded 
that the value of the evidence was neutral and thus did not contribute to the legal debate (Adam, 
2016). As this case demonstrates the importance of equipping jurors with the right means to 
assess the value of scientific evidence, it was selected for this article’s mock jury experiment 
and presented to participants in a somewhat adapted format.  In the adapted case report created 
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for this study, the circumstantial evidence described in the appeal judgment has been included 
to ensure that the second case is more complicated to assess. 
Both cases drew attention to the risks associated with admitting forensic evidence in 
court without sufficient scrutiny. Although both verdicts were quashed on appeal, there is no 
reason to believe that miscarriages of justice due to the admission of unreliable forensic 
techniques will not occur again. In Dallagher, rather than excluding the ear print evidence the 
Court of Appeal ordered a new trial to enable the defence to challenge the expert opinion. The 
court quashed the conviction after the introduction of DNA evidence but remained satisfied 
that the expert evidence had been properly admitted (Roberts, 2008). Edmond and Roberts 
(2011) have since expressed concern that, as the Law Commission report did not assert 
unequivocally that Dallagher was mistaken and that ear print evidence should not be 
admissible, unreliable evidence could continue to be admitted in future trials. The Law 
Commission’s report furthermore does not discuss existing research which suggests that lay 
people do not understand evidentiary expressions the way experts intent them to be understood 
(Edmond & Roberts, 2011). In appeals in which it is concluded that expert evidence should 
have been excluded the conviction may nevertheless be upheld if the court finds the verdict 
safe and the case persuasive based on the overall strength of the evidence (Edmond & Roberts, 
2011). This is problematic as jurors may have misunderstood evidentiary expressions and 
would have acquitted if the expert evidence had not been admitted. Developing a case report 
based on George allowed for an examination of the impact of gunpowder residue evidence 
presented in conjunction with other circumstantial evidence. It moreover allowed for an 
exploration of the efficacy of educating jurors by expressing evidentiary probability in the form 
of a likelihood ratio. Finally, Ward et al. (2017) have expressed the concern that, although the 
Crown Court Compendium summarizes the law related to expert evidence and provides 
guidance on how to direct the jury, it does not provide a clear distinction between evidence 
with a scientific basis and evidence that is scientifically meaningless or subjective. If the jury 
is not adequately instructed that opinion evidence based on experience is not scientific and 
should be treated with caution, questionable evidence similar to the ear print evidence in 
Dallagher can remain influential (Ward et al., 2017).  
 




Case 1 – Facts 
 A woman was found murdered in her bed at home. 
 The intruder used a jemmy or screwdriver to force open a small window above her bed. 
He suffocated her with a pillow after crawling through that window. 
 Examination of the scene revealed ear prints on the glass of the window, which had 
been cleaned three or four weeks earlier.  
The ear prints are examined by two experts who compare them with control prints provided 
by the suspect and others.  
 The first expert is a police officer and lecturer at a police college.  
o He has no formal qualifications but has specialized in ear print comparison for 
over a decade and is convinced that no two ear prints are alike. 
o He has testified world-wide and has published a book on the topic. 
 After examining the prints left at the scene of the crime, the expert reports being 
absolutely convinced that the prints of the suspect’s ear are identical with the prints of 
the ear on the window.  
o The expert explains that he looks for five or six points when making a 
comparison.  
o He emphasises that what matters is the totality of the evidence, which he reviews 
by the use of overlays, choosing available control prints which appear to be set at 
an appropriate angle.  
 The other expert furthermore concludes that it is very likely that the suspect made those 
prints. 
 The judge directs you, the jury, that if you are sure that the evidence of the first expert 
(who reports being absolutely convinced) is correct, you are entitled to convict on the 
basis of this evidence alone. 
  
Evidentiary Instruction 
 Ear print identification cannot be regarded as generally accepted in the scientific 
community. 
o An article published in the Journal of Forensic Sciences has indicated that 
forensic scientists have reservations about the extent to which ear print evidence 
alone can safely be used to identify a suspect.  
o The validity of ear identification is unknown and the research necessary to say 
anything about the validity of ear identification has not yet been conducted. 
 Neither the Forensic Science Service in the United Kingdom nor the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation in the United States carry out ear print comparisons.  
 Two previous convictions based on ear identification evidence in other countries have 
been overturned on appeal. 
 






Case 2 – Facts 
 A woman was shot and killed as she was about to enter her home. Her death was caused by 
a single shot to the head. 
 Almost a year later a suspect is arrested. 
 Evidence identifies the suspect as being at the scene about four hours before the murder was 
committed.  
 The prosecution characterises the suspect’s interview as containing repeated lies.  
 It is alleged that the suspect has attempted to create a false alibi for the time of the shooting. 
 
Scientific evidence 
 Among the findings by forensic scientists at the crime scene was firearm discharge residue 
in a bullet case and in the victim’s hair.  
 When searching the flat of the suspect almost a year after the crime, a coat is found which 
the suspect admits is his.  
 The coat is subjected to forensic examination by a Senior Forensic Science Officer, who 
discovers a single particle (about one hundredth of a millimetre) of firearm discharge 
residue in the right pocket of the coat.  
 The particle matches the essential elements of the firearm discharge residue found at the 
crime scene.  
 Although the suspect admits owning the coat and being the only one who used it, the suspect 
cannot recall whether or not he was wearing it at the day of the crime. 
 Two forensic scientists are called as witnesses in court: 
o The first expert states that, from experience, this type of residue would more often than 
not be found on the firer of the gun, but would not be found on ordinary members of the 
public unless they had been associated with firearms.  
o He states that it is most unlikely that the discharge residue finding is a result of innocent 
contamination.  
o Another well-qualified expert reviews these findings and agrees with them. 
 
Evidentiary instruction 
 The presence of a single particle in clothing gives no indication of how it got there. 
 It is not possible to determine if the single particle is the last remainder of a prior association 
with firearms or whether it was deposited quite recently from a lightly contaminated source. 
 The coat has been exposed to possibilities of innocent contamination during the police 
procedure.  
 A significant number of particles may be more indicative of direct contamination than of 
secondary (innocent) contamination, but only one particle was found in this coat. 
 The Forensic Science Service (FSS) reassesses the firearm discharge residue evidence that 
was provided at the suspect’s trial and concludes that:  
o The particle found in the right pocket of the suspect’s coat is indistinguishable from 
particles produced by the type of bullet used to shoot the victim, but a high proportion 
of bullets can produce such particles. 
o It would be just as likely that a single particle of discharge residue would have been 
recovered from the pocket of the suspect’s coat whether or not he was the person who 
shot the victim. 
o The firearm discharge residue evidence is inconclusive. It provides no assistance to 
anyone asked to judge which proposition (the suspect shot the victim versus the suspect 
did not shoot the victim) is true. 




The self-completion mock jury experiment, conducted through Bristol Online Survey which 
does not collect IP addresses, was distributed through convenience sampling on social media 
websites such as Facebook, LinkedIn, and Twitter. Furthermore, posters promoting the study 
were put up across various university buildings. Through this targeted sampling strategy, and 
in coherence with juror eligibility requirements, people from England and Wales between the 
age of 18 and 75 were considered eligible to participate in the study. As research has 
demonstrated that juror demographics such as gender, education, occupation and prior jury 
experience can influence a juror’s evaluation of scientific evidence (Cramer et al., 2009), 
participants were asked for the following demographics: gender, age, highest obtained 
educational qualification, previous completion of a statistics or research methods course, 
previous jury duty, and previous or current employment in the field of criminal justice and/or 
law enforcement. Additionally, as both case reports were based on real miscarriages of justice, 
participants were asked whether they recognised either one or both of the cases. These 
questions were included at the end of the survey to ensure that participants could not use them 
to draw inferences about the aim of the survey.  
 
Procedure 
This mock jury experiment took approximately fifteen to twenty minutes to complete on a 
desktop or laptop. The design was selected for its ease of use, lack of spatial restrictions, 
time/cost-effectiveness and the potential for a high response rate. The latter enabled the 
potential acquisition of a representative cross-section of a wider population. No incentive was 
provided for participation in this study. In this classic experimental case-control design, the 
test group (Group 1) was exposed to an initial evidentiary instruction about the ear print 
evidence described in Case 1 whereas the control group (Group 2) did not receive such an 
instruction. In order to randomly allocate participants between the two groups, participants with 
last names beginning with the letters A to K (Group 1) were asked to click on a different link 
than participants with last names beginning with the letters L to Z (Group 2). This distinction 
was hypothesised to create two even groups based on an analysis of frequency distributions of 
last names in the United Kingdom, but the aforementioned requested demographics allowed 
for an extra control to check whether the groups were alike in every aspect other than the 
experimental manipulation. Furthermore, to establish that the design was indeed a randomised 
controlled trial, the verdicts and answers provided by both groups before the provision of the 
first evidentiary instruction could be compared. 
In both surveys, the case facts were presented in the format of a written report and, 
before the presentation of each case, it was stated that to return a guilty verdict one had to be 
certain beyond a reasonable doubt. This specification, that the prosecution must prove its case 
against the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt, is referred to as the criminal standard of proof 
(Child et al., 2015). After reading the first case report, all participants were asked to return their 
verdict as follows: (1) Certainly Innocent, (2) Probably Innocent, (3) Probably Guilty and (4) 
Certainly Guilty. By granting four answers instead of a dichotomous verdict variable (i.e. 
Guilty or Not Guilty) it was possible to measure sophisticated changes in verdicts at later stages 
of the experiment without providing participants with an opportunity to remain neutral. An 
open question was included and so was a Likert scale for confidence: (1) Very Unconfident, 
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(2) Quite Unconfident, (3) Quite Confident and (4) Very Confident. Participants in Group 1 
furthermore received an evidentiary instruction (see Case 1 – Evidentiary Instruction) and were 
asked for a reassessment of their verdict and confidence rating (Figure 1). When navigating 
through the survey participants could not return to previous pages to edit a response in 
retrospect. 
All participants were subsequently presented with the second case report and were once 
more reminded that one must be certain beyond a reasonable doubt in order to return a guilty 
verdict. In this second case scenario, all participants were initially provided with peripheral 
evidence (suspect was at the scene four hours before the murder, the suspect’s interview 
contained repeated lies, the suspect allegedly attempted to create false alibi) and asked for a 
verdict and an answer to an open question about the reasoning behind this verdict. This 
approach was adopted in order to tease apart the impact of the other circumstantial evidence 
and the – about to be provided - forensic evidence. After the provision of the scientific 
evidence, all participants were asked for a reassessment of their verdict and confidence rating. 
This was followed by an evidentiary instruction and a final request for verdicts and confidence 
levels. This design aimed to keep as many variables consistent across both test groups in order 
to control for potential confounding factors.        
 
















Figure 1 – Experimental Design 
 
Coding and Scoring 
The inclusion of open-ended questions allowed for an exploration of the full range of responses 
obtained as it did not constrain the respondents’ opinions to predetermined categories (Sapsford 
& Jupp, 2006). After identifying multiple common themes, those themes were grouped together 
based on similarity to form six categories of open answers about the first case report and five 
categories of open answers about the second case report. Every category was given a code and 
every participant was scored as either Yes (1) if they mentioned that category in their answer 
or No (2) if they did not. This approach was adopted to take into account that some participants 
Group 1 Group 2 
 
 
Case 1 – All 
Evidence 
-  
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addressed multiple themes or categories in their answer. Although the inclusion of open 
answers provides respondents with a sense that their responses are not constrained, and can 
thus help improve the naturalism of the method, the potential for bias introduced by the coder 
is considerable (Sapsford & Jupp, 2006). As the analysis of the open questions by the first 
author could indeed give rise to role conflict and biased interpretations, the categorization of 
the answers to the open questions was controlled by an impartial observer. In case of 
disagreement between the experimenter and the impartial observer, a final decision was made 
by the second author. 
 
Ethical considerations 
This research gained ethical approval from the independent Ethics Committee of the University 
of Portsmouth. Although anonymized and modified to fit a report format, the reports remain 
based on real court cases and potential participants were therefore provided with a disclaimer 
about distressing case information in the Participant Information Sheet. Participation was 
voluntary, anonymous and no incentives were provided. Participants received informed 
consent forms and were informed of their right to withdraw.  
 
Results 
Analytical Approach  
Parametric tests are typically used to analyse continuous data whereas nonparametric tests are 
used to assess ordinal or ranked data such as data generated from Likert scales. However, 
research shows that, for studies with a large sample size, it can be appropriate to analyse data 
generated from Likert scales with parametric tests (Fagerland, 2012). Indeed, most parametric 
tests depend on a normal distribution of means and the means of studies with a sample size 
larger than 10 respondents per group are approximately normally distributed (Norman, 2010). 
If one were to use a parametric and a non-parametric test on the same data, the parametric test 
would have greater power to detect a true effect than the non-parametric test (Field, 2018). In 
other words, if there is a genuine effect a non-parametric tests is less likely to detect it than a 
parametric test (Field, 2018). To summarize, because treating Likert data with high response 
rates as ordinal prevents one from benefiting from the powerful and nuanced understanding 
parametric tests produce, restraining the analysis to non-parametric tests can lead to a loss of 
information (Carifio & Perla, 2008; Mircioiu & Atkinson, 2017). Non-parametric test 
equivalents were conducted nonetheless and indeed provided similar results.  
 
Sample Characteristics 
In Group 1, three participants were excluded for failing to answer either one or both of the open 
questions and two participants were excluded for indicating to have recognised either one or 
both of the cases. One respondent in Group 2 was excluded for responding to the open questions 
in Dutch and one respondent who indicated to have recognised either one or both of the cases 
was excluded. After exclusion of seven respondents, the final number of respondents was 174 
(Group 1 = 100, Group 2 = 74). As can be seen in Table 1, the final sample consisted 
predominantly of higher educated, young, female participants.  
 
 




Frequency Table of Demographics. 
  Group 1 Group 2 Totals 
  N % N % N % 
Gender Male  
 
21 21.0 18 24.3 39 22.4 
Female 
 
78 78.0 55 74.3 133 76.4 
Other 
 
1 1.0 1 1.4 2 1.1 
Age 18 – 24 
 
51 51.0 40 54.1 91 52.3 
25 – 34  
 
16 16.0 14 18.9 30 17.2 
35 – 44 
 
10 10.0 6 8.1 16 9.2 
45 – 54 
 
13 13.0 5 6.8 18 10.3 
55 – 64 
 
9 9.0 6 8.1 15 8.6 
65 – 75 
 






0 0.0 1 1.4 1 0.6 
Lower secondary 
school  
1 1.0 0 0.0 1 0.6 
Upper secondary 
school  




32 32.0 22 29.7 54 31.0 
University or 
college degree 






46 46.0 40 54.1 86 49.4 
No 
 





6 6.0 0 0.0 6 3.4 
No 
 








6 6.0 3 4.1 9 5.2 
No 94 94.0 71 95.9 165 94.8 
 Totals 100 100.0 74 100.0 174 100.0 
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Impact of Age, Education, Statistical Knowledge and Gender on Verdict Severity 
No significant differences in verdict severity ratings (Certainly Innocent, Probably Innocent, 
Probably Guilty, and Certainly Guilty) were established between various age categories, level 
of obtained qualification or completion of a statistics course. Research has suggested that 
female jurors may initially be tougher on defendants but are more susceptible to persuasion in 
deliberations than male jurors (Thomas, 2010). An independent-samples t-test conducted to 
examine gender differences in verdict severity for the initial verdicts about ear print evidence 
in Case 1 demonstrated no significant difference in verdicts between males (M = 2.69, SD = 
.73) and females (M = 2.92, SD = .59; t (53.39) = -1.76, p = .08, two-tailed). 
A mixed between-within subjects analysis of variance was conducted to assess the 
impact of gender on verdict severity across three types of evidence (circumstantial evidence, 
gunpowder residue evidence, and an evidentiary instruction) in the second case (Table 2). The 
two participants who had selected ‘Other/Prefer not to say’ when asked about gender were 
excluded from the gender analysis. There was no significant interaction between gender and 
type of evidence, Wilk’s Lambda = .99, F (2, 169) = .55, p = .58, partial eta squared = .01. The 
main effect when comparing male and female verdict severity was not significant, F (1, 170) 
= .22, p =.63, partial eta squared = .001 suggesting no gender differences in verdict severity 
across different types of evidence. 
 
Table 2 
Gender Comparison of Verdict Severity.  
 Male Female 
Type of Evidence n M SD n M SD 
Circumstantial Evidence 39 2.33 .66 133 2.47 .64 
Gunpowder Residue Evidence 39 2.90 .75 133 2.89 .73 
Evidentiary Instruction 39 2.33 .77 133 2.35 .60 
 
Case 1 
Verdict Severity and Confidence  
At this point in the experiment, both groups had read a report about the first case, in which ear 
print evidence was central to the case. As there had been no manipulation at this stage, no 
significant difference was expected in the independent samples t-test. Indeed, there was no 
significant difference in verdict severity between Group 1 (M = 2.79, SD = .70) and Group 2 
(M = 2.95, SD = .55). Furthermore, there was no significant difference in reported confidence 
levels between Group 1 (M = 2.87, SD = .76) and Group 2 (M = 2.81, SD = .72) either.  
 
Open Answers  
The open question posed after the first verdict encouraged participants to elaborate on the 
reasoning behind their verdict. The ear print evidence was presented in a manner which made 
it central to the case. In other words, it would be nearly impossible to return a verdict without 
actively assessing the value of this evidence because any other circumstantial evidence had 
purposely been excluded from the report. As the manipulation for Group 1 (an evidentiary 
instruction) was provided afterwards, one would expect the initial open answers to be relatively 
comparable amongst both groups. The open answers of both groups were relatively similar 
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(Table 3). However, it seems that in Group 2 a higher percentage of respondents discussed the 
first expert’s testimony in their elaboration, whereas the comment that there is not enough 
evidence to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt was mentioned less. As the 
aforementioned independent samples t-test demonstrated no significant difference between the 
verdicts of both groups, these findings are hard to explain. It is possible that the respondents 
mentioned the evidence because it was so central to the case report but did not let it sway them 
towards a significantly different verdict. If the participants in Group 2 had considered the 
evidence more convincing this should have been reflected in a significantly harsher verdict, 
which was not the case. 
 
Table 3 
Frequency Table of Coded Open Answers Case 1. 
 Group 1 Group 2 Total 
 N % N % N % 
Based on the first expert’s 
testimony 
 
43 33.3 40 43.9 83 37.7 
Not enough evidence for guilty 
beyond reasonable doubt 
 
38 29.5 15 16.5 53 24.1 
Based on the testimony of both 
experts combined 
 
17 13.2 12 13.2 29 13.2 
The expert lacks qualifications 
and/or ear print evidence is not 
reliable 
15 11.6 12 13.2 27 12.3 
Ear print on the window could have 
happened another time and/or 
someone else could be involved 
12 9.3 8 8.8 20 9.1 
Other 
 
4 3.1 4 4.4 8 3.6 
Totals 129 100.0 91 100.0 220  100.0 
 
 
Impact of Evidentiary Instruction  
A paired-samples t-test, used when collecting data from one group of participants on two 
different occasions, was conducted to evaluate the impact of an evidentiary instruction on the 
verdict severity ratings of participants in Group 1. There was a statistically significant decrease 
in verdict severity from M = 2.79, SD = .70 after the initial evidence to M = 2.28, SD = .67 
after the provision of an evidentiary instruction, t (99) = 8.58, p < .001 (two-tailed). The mean 
decrease in the verdict severity score was .51 with a 95% confidence interval ranging from .392 
to .628. The eta squared statistic (.43) indicated a large effect size. The guidelines for 
interpreting this value are .01=small effect, .06=moderate effect, .14=large effect (Pallant, 
2013). In other words, after reading the evidentiary instruction, participants in Group 1 returned 
significantly less punitive verdicts.  
 




Open Answers  
Participants were asked to respond to a second open question after the provision of the 
circumstantial evidence of Case 2 (Table 4). It was decided not to provide participants with 
both the circumstantial evidence and the central gunpowder residue evidence at once in order 
to remain capable of teasing apart exactly how much this gunpowder evidence impacted upon 
the verdict. It was hypothesised that gunpowder evidence, for it is perceived to be more 
scientific, should have a greater impact on juror verdicts than circumstantial evidence. Most 
respondents indeed considered the circumstantial evidence alone insufficient to establish guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt, and the responses of Group 1 and Group 2 were comparable. 
 
Table 4 
Frequency Table of Coded Open Answers Case 2. 
 Group 1 Group 2 Total 
 N % N % N % 
Not enough evidence for guilty 
beyond a reasonable doubt 
58 48.3 47 50.5 105 49.3 
Based on the available evidence 
 
39 32.5 29 31.2 68 31.9 
It has been a year since the crime 
 
13 10.8 10 10.8 23 10.8 
He may have lied for another reason 
 
6 5.0 6 6.4 12 5.6 
Other 
 
4 3.3 1 1.1 5 2.3 
Totals 120 100.0 93 100.0 213 100.0 
 
Verdict Severity and Confidence 
A one-way repeated measures ANOVA (which tests for significant differences in the mean of 
a dependant variable across two or more conditions) was conducted to compare the returned 
verdict ratings of all participants for Case 2 after the provision of circumstantial evidence, 
gunpowder residue evidence and an evidentiary instruction. The means and standard deviations 
are presented in Table 5. There was a significant effect, Wilks’ Lambda = .60, F (2, 172) = 
56.45, p < .001, multivariate partial eta squared = .39 which indicates a large effect size. In 
other words, there was a significant change in verdict severity ratings across the three different 
types of evidence. 
 
Table 5  
Descriptive Statistics of Verdict Severity after Circumstantial Evidence, Gunpowder Residue 
Evidence and Evidentiary Instructions. 
 
Time Period N Mean Standard Deviation 
Circumstantial Evidence 174 2.44 .66 
Gunpowder Residue Evidence 174 2.90 .75 
Evidentiary Instruction 174 2.35 .64 
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A one-way repeated measures ANOVA was conducted to compare reported confidence ratings 
after the return of verdict ratings about circumstantial evidence, gunpowder residue evidence 
and the evidentiary instruction. The means and standard deviations are presented in Table 6. 
There was a significant effect for confidence level, Wilks’ Lambda = .93, F = (2, 172) = 6.32, 
p = .002, multivariate partial eta squared = .068. 
 
Table 6 
Descriptive Statistics Confidence after Verdict Circumstantial Evidence, Gunpowder Residue 
Evidence and Evidentiary Instruction. 
 
Verdict Confidence N Mean Standard Deviation 
After Circumstantial Evidence 174 2.75 .78 
After Gunpowder Residue Evidence 174 2.84 .74 
After Evidentiary Instruction 174 2.64 .79 
 
Scepticism Effect 
An independent samples t-test demonstrated no significant difference in verdict severity 
between Group 1 (M = 2.36, SD = .64) and Group 2 (M = 2.55, SD = .67) after provision of the 
circumstantial evidence of Case 2. This could indicate that the assessment of the previous 
evidentiary instruction about ear print evidence by Group 1 did not cause a generalized 
scepticism effect which extended to circumstantial evidence. Furthermore, no significant 
difference between the reported confidence ratings of Group 1 (M = 2.81, SD = .76) and Group 
2 (M = 2.89, SD = .71) was found. 
An independent-samples t-test was conducted to compare the verdict severity scores of 
both groups after the provision of gunpowder residue evidence. There was a significant 
difference in scores for Group 1 (M = 2.79, SD = .73) and Group 2 (M = 3.05, SD = .72; t (172) 
= -2.38, p = .02, two-tailed). However, the magnitude of the differences in the means (mean 
difference = -.26, 95% CI: -.48 to -.04) was small (eta squared = .032). An independent-samples 
t-test was conducted to compare the verdict severity scores of Group 1 and Group 2 after the 
provision of an evidentiary instruction about the gunpowder residue evidence. There was a 
significant difference in scores for Group 1 (M = 2.23, SD = .66) and Group 2 (M = 2.51, SD = 
.58; t (172) = -2.94, p = .004, two-tailed. The magnitude of the differences in the means (mean 
difference = -.28, 95% CI: -.47 to -.09) was quite small (eta squared = .048).  
A mixed between-within subjects analysis of variance was conducted to assess the 
impact of (not) receiving an evidentiary instruction in Case 1 on participants’ subsequent 
verdicts severity ratings across three types of evidence presented in Case 2 (circumstantial 
evidence, gunpowder residue evidence and evidentiary instruction) (Table 7). This analysis, at 
times referred to as a split-plot ANOVA, tests both whether there are main effects for the two 
independent variables and whether the interaction between the two variables is significant 
(Pallant, 2013). In this case the between-subjects variable was Group (Group 1 received a 
previous evidentiary instruction while Group 2 did not), the within-subjects variable was Type 
of Evidence (circumstantial evidence, gunpowder evidence, evidentiary instruction) and the 
continuous dependent variable was Verdict Severity. There was no significant interaction 
between group and verdict severity, Wilks’ Lambda = .996, F (2, 171) = .354, p = .702, partial 
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eta squared = .004. Perhaps counterintuitively this non-significant interaction is favourable as 
it indicates that the changes in verdict severity across three types of evidence are not the same 
for both groups. There was a substantial main effect for type of evidence, Wilks’ Lambda = 
.610, F (2, 171) = 54.730, p < .001, partial eta squared .390, with both groups showing an 
increased verdict severity rating after the gunpowder residue evidence and a subsequent 
reduced verdict severity rating after the evidentiary instruction (Figure 2). When comparing 
the two groups the main effect was significant, F (1, 172) = 9.874, p = .002, partial eta squared 
= .054, suggesting a difference between the verdict severity ratings of Group 1, who received 
a previous evidentiary instruction, and Group 2 who did not receive such an instruction.  
 
Table 7 
Group Comparison of Verdict Severity.  
 Group 1 Group 2 
Evidence n M SD n M SD 
Circumstantial Evidence 100 2.36 .64 74 2.55 .67 
Gunpowder Residue Evidence 100 2.79 .73 74 3.05 .72 
Evidentiary Instruction 100 2.23 .66 74 2.51 .58 
 
 
Figure 2 - Group Comparison of Verdict Severity after (1) Circumstantial Evidence, (2) 
Gunpowder Residue Evidence, and (3) Evidentiary Instruction. 
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Verdict - Central vs. Peripheral Evidence 
As can be seen in Figure 3, both groups were less likely to return a guilty verdict based on 
circumstantial evidence alone compared to either scientific evidence alone or a scenario with 
both circumstantial evidence and scientific evidence.  
 
Figure 3 - Group Comparison of Verdict Severity after Scientific Evidence Case 1 (1), 




This study demonstrates that both ear print and gunpowder residue evidence were considered 
convincing indicators of guilt regardless of the fact that neither type of forensic evidence 
provided direct or irrefutable proof of guilt. Previous research has indicated that jurors are 
inclined to trust expert witnesses. This was confirmed in Case 1, in which both the test and 
control group were predominantly willing to return a guilty verdict and mentioned the first 
expert’s testimony as the main reason for this decision. Remarkably, jurors who reasoned that 
not enough evidence had been provided to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt did not 
always return an innocent verdict. A ‘Probably Guilty’ option which could be used if jurors 
were not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt, but nevertheless felt inclined to return a guilty 
verdict, may explain this finding. After the test group was provided with an evidentiary 
instruction, a significant decrease in verdict severity was observed in which mock jurors 
returned a ‘Probably Innocent’ instead of a ‘Probably Guilty’ verdict. This may indicate that 
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the evidentiary instruction successfully educated jurors about the questionable reliability of the 
ear print evidence.  
 For Case 2 it was hypothesised that the initial non-scientific circumstantial evidence 
would be considered insufficient to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt but that mock 
jurors would become swayed by the scientific aura of the gunpowder residue evidence provided 
afterwards. It was found that jurors attributed low levels of weight to non-scientific 
circumstantial evidence as the initial peripheral evidence was predominantly considered 
insufficient to return a guilty verdict. Indeed, the general theme in the open answers of both 
groups, before the provision of the gunpowder residue evidence, was that there was not enough 
evidence to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The content of the open answers 
indicated that jurors were both capable and willing to engage in systematic processing of the 
evidence. When comparing verdict severity scores across all types of evidence presented in 
Case 2 (circumstantial evidence, gunpowder residue evidence, and the evidentiary instruction) 
it was found that verdict severity increased significantly after the provision of gunpowder 
residue evidence. This could indicate that scientific evidence is considered a more persuasive 
indicator of guilt than other circumstantial evidence. The provision of an evidentiary instruction 
about the questionable reliability of gunpowder residue evidence led to a significant decrease 
in verdict severity, indicating that the instruction may have successfully educated jurors about 
the questionable reliability or probative value of that evidence. To summarize, the evidentiary 
instruction seemed to encourage a more cautious appraisal of the scientific evidence which 
resulted in a more lenient verdict. It furthermore impacted jurors’ confidence levels as most 
jurors reported feeling less confident about the returned verdict. 
There was no significant difference in verdict severity between the test and control 
group after the provision of the initial circumstantial evidence of Case 2. This could indicate 
that mock jurors were well aware of the fact that this peripheral evidence was not scientific, 
and that the initial evidentiary instruction about the ear print evidence thus did not cause a 
generalised scepticism effect. After the subsequent provision of gunpowder residue evidence, 
a significant difference in verdict severity could be observed as Group 1 became more lenient 
in their verdicts than Group 2. In other words, it seemed that the initial evidentiary instruction 
did not give rise to a scepticism effect in the assessment of general circumstantial evidence but 
did trigger a scepticism effect for new unrelated scientific evidence. This significant difference 
was also observed after the provision of the second evidentiary instruction, as Group 1 
remained more lenient than Group 2 and predominantly returned a ‘Probably Innocent’ verdict. 
 
Practical Implications 
The present study underscores that the provision of an evidentiary instruction has the potential 
to educate jurors about the limitations of scientific evidence. This could be good news because 
an evidentiary instruction can be implemented with relative ease and has been implemented 
before. As aforementioned, in England and Wales judges provide guidance on the assessment 
of eyewitness identification evidence through the Turnbull directions. Surprisingly, there has 
been little empirical research into the efficacy of these directions, and it is thus unknown 
whether they successfully educate jurors about the reliability of eyewitness identification 
evidence. Moreover, the directions focus on event characteristics but say little about the 
procedural causes of false identification. Although the PACE Codes mandate many aspects of 
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identiﬁcation procedures and, for example, state that care must be taken not to direct the 
witness’ attention to any one individual, aspects such as the exact wording of instructions given 
to witnesses prior to the procedure are not included (Horry et al., 2013; Home Office, 2017). 
Therefore, an eyewitness who had decent viewing conditions but a biased procedure would 
most likely be considered reliable. In other words, even if the Turnbull direction is effective, it 
is not ideal and a revision would be recommendable. 
An important question relates to who would create, revise, and control the delivery of 
evidentiary instructions. The adversarial system assumes active fact-finding by defence and 
prosecution, but the reality is that the defence often does not employ their own expert. It is 
therefore desirable that the creation of evidentiary instructions is controlled by an independent 
party, in cooperation with the scientific community, and that the judge is enabled to enforce 
their implementation. Statistical experts have suggested that a summary of expert reports 
containing statistical or probabilistic evidence (e.g. likelihood ratios) should be made publicly 
available, a suggestion which could be extended to expert reports about all types of scientific 
evidence (Buchanan, 2007). In the USA, the President's Council of Advisors on Science and 
Technology (2016) has recommended that an independent scientific body should evaluate 
forensic science methodologies and explain their strengths and limitations with regards to their 
capability to provide accurate and reliable answers to specific and well-defined forensic 
questions. To ensure that scientific judgements are independent and unbiased, such evaluations 
must be conducted by a science agency with no stake in the outcome (Charlton, 2013).  
The aforementioned scientific guides are a good start, but scientists are expected to 
volunteer their time to contribute to such guides. What has been disregarded in this discussion 
but may be just as relevant, is what Charlton (2013) refers to as a ‘standard of expediency’. 
The reality is that improvements can only be introduced within certain fiscal boundaries, and 
financial constraints may ultimately determine the level and degree to which changes can be 
implemented. The standard of expediency is thus a balance between what is scientifically 
desired and what can be afforded (Charlton, 2013). It would be futile to develop technologies 
that increase juror understanding and minimise the effects of junk science if the cost of those 
tools is too prohibitive (Charlton, 2013). The question is whether the intrinsic risks involved in 
achieving a financial compromise are acceptable when considering the grave potential 
consequences of error in the criminal justice system (Charlton, 2013; Dodd, 2017).  
Although it would be ideal to have a validation study addressing the reliability and 
consistency of a particular procedure or analysis for the precise conditions of each case, it is 
unlikely that resources would be made available for such testing and it is furthermore unlikely 
that case conditions can be faithfully reproduced (Martire & Edmond, 2017). This does not 
have to be incapacitating for the analysis of scientific expertise, as long as courts have access 
to validity data from other experts who have applied that particular methodology and can 
identify conditions under which performance is better or worse as well as whether those experts 
performed the task better than untrained people (Martire & Edmond, 2017). As 
aforementioned, evidentiary instructions could be more cost-effective than the provision of 
opposing expert testimony and may eventually reduce the number of costly appeal procedures 
for potential miscarriages of justice. In cases involving pattern matching sciences, the issue is 
not necessarily whether a procedure does or does not work. It is rather how well it works, in 
what conditions, and how the expert should express their opinion to accurately capture the 
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value of the evidence in a manner that facilitates juror comprehension (Martire & Edmond, 
2017). Shapiro et al. (2015) found that, in cases with psychological expert testimony, the issues 
raised in court often centred on the weight the testimony should be given in the decision rather 
than the general admissibility. Indeed, in some circumstances judges may only need to 
moderate the strength of the expert’s claim (Martire & Edmond, 2017). As the legal system is 
ill-equipped to correct the issues that come with the introduction of scientific evidence, the 
scientific community itself should be a crucial source for research and reforms (Garrett & 
Neufeld, 2009). To further enhance the contribution of expert witnesses and scientific evidence 
in court it is important to stimulate a closer partnership between academics and the judiciary, 
in which key stakeholders can work together to seek acceptable improvements so that research 
can contribute to a fair and accurate administration of justice (Dror et al., 2013). 
 
Limitations  
Although mock jury studies are the prevalent methodology for empirical research on juror 
comprehension of scientific evidence, such studies are often criticised for a lack of external 
validity (Lieberman et al., 2016). Written case summaries may not adequately simulate the 
actual courtroom experience (McAuliff & Duckworth, 2010). Nevertheless, comparisons of 
decision making by mock jurors and real jurors have failed to uncover major consistent 
differences as both types of jurors seem to reason in similar ways (Sklansky, 2013). Assessment 
of real case transcripts reveals that the information required for a rational evaluation of forensic 
evidence is not available to judges or jurors in the vast majority of cases (Edmond, 2015a). 
This observed lack of relevant information underlines a fundamental issue with observational 
studies and exit surveys, which is that it is of questionable value to study claims about 
comprehension made by decision-makers who were not provided with the necessary 
information required to assess the evidence to begin with (Edmond, 2015a). Therefore, as long 
as a mock jury study does not claim to replicate the actual courtroom experience and the severe 
consequences that come with a wrongful conviction, its findings can still have merit as such 
findings can provide an insight into juror reasoning, how this reasoning can be optimised, and 
can demonstrate the importance of regulations against the admittance of junk science in court.  
The sample of this study consisted predominantly of higher educated young women 
and the findings may therefore not extend to real juries with more diverse demographics. 
Moreover, as jurors were assessing old court cases, they must have realised that their verdicts 
would not directly impact the lives of victims, suspects, and perpetrators. Participants also 
completed the survey in isolation, and the group dynamics of jury deliberation were thus not 
accounted for. This could be a disadvantage, although Devine et al. (2016) found that jury 
deliberation seems to have little impact on the final verdict. It was decided to adopt a Likert 
scale approach to assessing innocence in order to be able to examine more sophisticated verdict 
changes. Jurors in real courtrooms do not have this luxury as they must decide dichotomously 
between guilty or not guilty. However, as jurors in real trials undoubtedly experience 
uncertainty before reaching a dichotomous verdict decision as well, it would be interesting to 
assess whether mock jurors who returned probably innocent or probably guilty verdicts are 
more easily convinced to reassess that verdict during the deliberation than jurors who returned 
certainly innocent or certainly guilty verdicts.  
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Jurors in experimental settings may be more sensitive to evidence quality than real 
jurors because the provision of a written stimulus allows them to control the rate at- and the 
degree to which they process the evidence (McAuliff & Duckworth, 2010). A written report 
format nevertheless became the preferred choice of assessment as studies examining decision 
making differences between videotaped and written expert testimony have uncovered no effect 
on trial-related decisions (McAuliff et al., 2009). The reports presented in this study were 
derived from Court of Appeal judgments and designed to reflect the content of those trial 
summaries as accurately as possible. This undeniably remains a relatively impoverished 
stimulus, but this research aimed to examine central or systematic processing which is 
encouraged by ensuring that the decision maker is capable of meticulously analysing and 
evaluating the quality of the evidence. The report format therefore allowed for an attempt to 
avoid peripheral or heuristic processing by factoring out source-related cues such as likeability, 
displayed confidence level, and attractiveness (McAuliff et al., 2009).  One could argue that, if 
justice ought to be blind, a study which factors such biases can stimulate a more factual 
assessment of the evidence. Nevertheless, it is undeniable that simulated case decisions do not 
carry the real-world consequences of an actual trial, and this realisation may impact the jurors’ 
motivation and willingness to engage in the systematic processing of the evidence (McAuliff 
& Duckworth, 2010). To encourage systematic processing as much as possible, the length of 
the case reports and the duration of the entire experiment were kept relatively short. 
 
Recommendations for further research 
Trial safeguards do not consistently expose the potential weaknesses of scientific evidence 
(Martire & Edmond, 2017). Therefore, research aimed at evaluating evidentiary safeguards is 
greatly needed to better accommodate jurors’ reasoning skills in trials with scientific evidence 
(McAuliff et al., 2009). Although the Turnbull directions are, as of yet, a rare example of the 
successful implementation of an evidentiary instruction in England and Wales, there is 
remarkably little knowledge about the effect of the directions on juror assessment of eyewitness 
identification evidence as this has not been evaluated in an experimental setting. Moreover, as 
the directions only inform jurors about witnessing conditions as opposed to procedural 
conditions, jurors could consider evidence obtained in a procedure with a biased officer reliable 
as long as the witnessing conditions were good. It is thus recommended that future research 
examines the efficacy of the directions both in its current state and in a revised format. The 
impact of the provision of evidentiary reports signed by multiple experts could also be 
examined as this requirement could serve as a gatekeeper for academic consensus.  
A downside of evidentiary instructions can be found in their potential to elicit 
unwarranted scepticism in the assessment of scientific evidence. Further research should thus 
examine whether the impact of an evidentiary instruction depends on the timing of its 
provision. In other words, is there a difference in verdict severity if the instruction is delivered 
(a) before the scientific evidence, (b) immediately after the scientific evidence, or (c) before 
the jury deliberation? With regard to group deliberations, which were unaccounted for in this 
study, it would be interesting to examine whether more qualified or educated members of the 
jury with experience in a profession related to the science at stake could influence the ultimate 
verdict of the rest of the jurors. 
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This study contained case summaries which were presented in a comprehensible report 
format in order to encourage systematic processing. However, real cases will involve more 
complex scientific evidence and expert testimony. It could thus be examined whether jurors 
are more willing to engage the systematic processing of evidence which is easier to understand 
or which is recognizable from, for example, crime television shows. Recent research has 
focused on neuroscientific evidence as neuroscience provides the law with opportunities and 
risks at the same time. The number of publications in the field of neuro-law has risen from 
approximately 100 publications in 2003 to nearly 1,200 publications by 2013 (Jones et al., 
2013). An increased insight into the workings of the brain can contribute to an understanding 
of a suspect’s behaviour, but academics fear that judges and jurors may fail to comprehend this 
type of evidence as a result of its complex and technical nature (de Kogel et al., 2013; Jones et 
al., 2013; Leonard, 2015). Research has indeed demonstrated that jurors are easily convinced 
by neuroscientific evidence, even if this is not merited (de Kogel et al., 2013). With numerous 
scientific breakthroughs on the horizon, this is reason for serious concern. As the use of 
neuroscientific evidence is on the rise but under-investigated, it could be examined whether 
jurors can be successfully educated on the relevance and reliability of such complex evidence. 
 
Conclusion 
Admissibility of forensic evidence has become a difficult concept in the law of criminal 
evidence (Charlton, 2013). Scientific conclusions are often expressed in probabilities and 
subject to continuous revision whereas the criminal law system adheres to a more dichotomous 
distinction of guilt versus innocence and expects disputes to be resolved swiftly (Ainsworth, 
2001; Ormerod & Sturman, 2005). As science is a fluid concept and new techniques are 
constantly evolving it should not be perceived to hold definitive answers (Ireland & Beaumont, 
2015). This observation may identify the core issue at stake, which is that guilt in the courtroom 
must be established beyond reasonable doubt while a scientist can never be entirely certain of 
findings (Canter & Alison, 1999).  
Conventional admissibility criteria regarding, for example, formal qualification and 
training, experience, and assistance to the jury do not provide an adequate insight into the 
validity or limitations of forensic evidence. It is concerning that the party relying upon forensic 
evidence is not required to demonstrate that the underlying technique is reliable or that the 
expert is proficient in its use (Edmond, 2015a). Whether a defendant is convicted could depend 
on which expert examines the evidence as experts can vary in performance due to different 
training, subjective decision thresholds, risk tolerance and even eyesight, (Dror & Murrie, 
2018). This is especially concerning when considering that forensic evidence is rarely contested 
in court. The current admissibility jurisprudence and legal practices, in particular in attempts 
to regulate feature comparison evidence, are misguided when compared to criteria promoted 
by scientific organisations (Edmond, 2015b). Moreover, recent developments reflect a greater 
concern for finality and efficiency with a reduced concern for establishing the truth (Anderson 
et al., 2005; Tully, 2018). A continuing focus on cost-reduction, which affects both commercial 
and government-funded forensic science practitioners, is eroding the potential for professional 
development and has left experts exposed to critique about failing to keep current on scientific 
developments and to provide the court with accurate information regarding the range of 
scientific opinions within a field (Tully, 2018).  
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To effectuate a proper functioning of the judicial decision-making process it is 
important to improve juror understanding of scientific evidence. This mock jury experiment 
demonstrated that feature comparison evidence is highly persuasive as it swayed mock jurors 
towards guilty verdicts despite the fact that neither the ear print nor the gunpowder residue 
evidence were direct indicators of guilt. Moreover, feature comparison evidence was 
considered convincing proof of guilt both when presented on its own and when presented in 
conjunction with other circumstantial evidence. The introduction of an evidentiary instruction 
successfully educated mock jurors about the limitations of such evidence and stimulated a 
verdict reassessment. The hypothesised scepticism effect applied to feature comparison 
evidence only insofar as no significant difference was observed between test and control group 
verdicts regarding the circumstantial evidence presented in the second case. One could argue 
that the observed scepticism effect may be desirable as compensation for the observation that 
jurors tend to overestimate the value of a match between samples.  Indeed, if one were to agree 
with Blackstone’s argument that it is better to have ten guilty persons escape than one innocent 
suffer, inducing scepticism about scientific evidence introduced in court is not necessarily 
undesirable for it may reduce false positives (Papailiou et al., 2014).  
If properly executed and blind to contextual information, scientific evidence has the 
potential to enhance the quality of fact-finding. However, it should not be perceived to hold 
definitive answers and scientists should acknowledge potential exposure to biased information 
and ensure not to overstate the value of their findings. In the absence of the equality of arms 
upon which adversarial fact-finding is thought to depend, the introduction of evidentiary 
instructions can stimulate a more adequate evaluation of feature comparison evidence. 
Informative protocols which stimulate the critical assessment and adequate delivery of 
scientific evidence in court must be developed to improve juror comprehension of the reliability 
and potential limitations of scientific evidence. As judges and attorneys have expressed 
discomfort with the task of reviewing the validity of scientific evidence, an independent body 
should be responsible for the development of evidentiary instructions about various types of 
scientific evidence. The accruement of an extensive evidence base is desirable to successfully 
provoke the implementation of such instructions. Therefore, further research into the effective 
implementation of safeguards against the admittance of unreliable science in court is direly 
needed if we truly wish to improve the criminal justice system and prevent miscarriages of 
justice. Although mock jury study designs come with limitations, this type of research remains 
relevant as it provides insight into potential ways in which such objectives can be achieved.  
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